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By using their financial reserves efficiently, pension funds can smooth shocks on asset 
returns, and can thus facilitate intergenerational risk-sharing. In addition to the primary 
benefit of improved time diversification, this form of risk allocation affords the additional 
benefit of allowing these funds to take better advantage of the equity premium, which also 
favors the consumers. In this paper, our aim is twofold. First, we characterize the socially 
efficient policy rules of a collective pension plan in terms of portfolio management, capital 
payments to retirees, and dividend payments to shareholders. We examine both the first-best 
rules and the second-best rules, where, in the latter case, the fund is constrained by a solvency 
ratio and by a guaranteed minimum return to workers’ contributions. Second, we measure the 
social surplus of the system compared to a situation in which each generation would save and 
invest in isolation for its own retirement. One of the main results of the paper is that better 
intergenerational risk-sharing does not reduce the risk born by each generation. Rather, it 
increases the expected return to the workers’ contributions. 
JEL Code: D9. 
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In competitive ﬁnancial markets, the inability of current generations to share
their risks with those who are not born yet makes these markets ineﬃcient.
This point was made by Diamond (1977), Gordon and Varian (1988), Ball
and Mankiw (2001) and Shiller (1999,2003) among others. In a funded sys-
tem with individual pension accounts, the absence of any intergenerational
sharing of individual portfolio risk implies that workers face high uncertainty
on their future pension wealth. In the recent past, many workers had to
reduce drastically their standard of living and to work longer after sizeable
downturns of ﬁnancial markets. This inability of markets to allocate risk
eﬃciently across generations has been used to argue in favor of more pub-
lic intervention, in particular in the form of strenger pay-as-you-go (PAYG)
systems.1 However, the European experience with PAYG systems tells us
that organizing such risk sharing eﬃciently is subject to a strong political
constraint, since current generations are more reluctant to compensate losses
than to consume the surpluses of the system. Moreover, the expected return
of the PAYG is relatively low compared to the expected return of ﬁnancial
markets.
The United States followed another road with their 1983 Social Security
Reforms. The so-called Greenspan Commission reforms involved imposing
a mandatory contribution from active baby-boom generations to partially
pre-fund their retirements.2 These federal trust funds have accumulated al-
most $3 trillion since then. The aim of this paper is to examine how and
by how much such a prefunded system can solve the intergenerational risk
sharing ineﬃciency. Such a funded system makes intergenerational risk shar-
ing possible if the trust funds can disconnect generational contributions to
generational pension beneﬁts. But this, however, raises the question of which
rules should govern these implicit intergenerational cross-subsidizations. It
also raises the question of what the funds’ assets management strategy should
be. These two questions are jointly addressed in this paper.
The properties of ex ante Pareto-eﬃcient rules for intergenerational risk
s h a r i n gh a v eb e e ne x a m i n e di ns e v e r al recent papers. For example, Bohn
(2003) considers a general equilibrium model of a closed economy and show
1See for example Aaron, Blinder, Munnell and Orzag (2000), and Burtless (2000).
2The United Kingdom and the Netherlands implemented similar prefunded systems.
1that governments, by typically promising safe public pensions and issuing
safe debt, do not transfer enough risk on the shoulders of current retirees.
In the same vein, Krueger and Kubler (2002) show that when returns to
physical capital and human capital are imperfectly correlated, the consump-
tion variance of all generations can be reduced by implementing a PAYG
system in which pension beneﬁts would be indexed on labor incomes. De
Menil, Murtin and Sheshinsky (2006) study ex ante Pareto improving social
security reforms when the return of individual saving accounts is uncertain,
assuming that transfers only from the young to the old can be implemented.
Van Hermert (2005) extends this analysis by considering a model with four-
state correlated risks on human and ﬁnancial capital. He characterizes the
ex-ante Pareto eﬃcient risk sharing rule within a standard PAYG system,
together with the households’ optimal portfolio allocation.
Contrary to the above-mentioned papers which focus on PAYG systems,
Cui, de Jong and Ponds (2006), following Teulings and de Vries (2006), ex-
amine a funded system with a realistic description of risks on ﬁnancial mar-
kets. They compare the welfare implications of the fund’s risk allocation, in
particular deﬁn e dc o n t r i b u t i o n( D C )s c h e m e sa n dd e ﬁned beneﬁts c h e m e s .
They conclude that funded pension schemes that provide safer and smoother
consumption streams are welfare improving compared with pure individual
pension schemes. The welfare gain of the intergenerational risk-sharing in
their benchmark model is equivalent to a permanent increase of consumption
by 2.3% (when relative risk aversion equals 5). They also show that collective
schemes should be much more risk-prone than individual ones because of the
better time diversiﬁcation that the former ones provides.
In this paper, we also optimize jointly on the retirement beneﬁtp o l i c ya n d
on the fund’s asset allocation strategy. Our model diﬀers from Cui, de Jong
and Ponds (2006) by the introduction of a guaranteed minimum return on
pension saving to all future generations. This innovation is made for realism,
in spite of the fact that such constraint in welfare-deteriorating. We associate
a formal solvency constraint to the guaranteed minimum return, which states
that the value of the fund’s assets must always be larger than the market value
of the fund’s liabilities. Because we want to characterize operational rules for
a collective DC fund, we consider in this paper an OLG model in which each
generation contributes to the fund for n =4 0p e r i o d s ,e a c hp e r i o dl a s t i n go n e
year. We describe an explicit intergenerational risk sharing mechanism based
on a transparent funded pension system, and we measure the social surplus
2that this system generates compared to a standard individual account DC
scheme. Each year, a new generation of workers starts contributing to the
fund, and another generation leaves the fund with a pension beneﬁtt h a ti s
endogenously determined. The pension beneﬁti sc o n t i n g e n to nt h el e v e lo f
the fund’s reserves.
Contrary to most existing papers with the notable exceptions of Cui, de
Jong and Ponds (2006) and van Hemert (2005), the choice of the portfolio is
endogenous to the model, and can be made contingent on the fund’s reserves.
Another important diﬀerence with the existing literature is that we assume
that the government delegates the management of the scheme to a trust fund
controlled by shareholders. The shareholders bring equity to the fund when
it is created in exchange for future dividends. This deal is governed by a
participation constraint from the viewpoint of shareholders. By providing
capital to the system, the trust fund is able to oﬀer portfolio insurance to
workers that takes the form of a minimum return to their savings. The
problem is to determine for each year and for each contingency, the optimal
portfolio of assets, the payment of beneﬁts to the new pensioners, and the
distribution of dividends to the shareholders of the insurance company. The
trust fund is constrained by a solvency ratio, which guarantees that the
current market value of assets is always larger than the current market value
of the minimum liabilities to the contributing workers. The existence of such
a constraint has two central consequences. First, it reduces the ability of
the funded scheme to transfer risk to future generations. Second, it makes
the problem analytically intractable. As a, our results rely on a numerical
optimization procedure.
The most important message of this paper is that a better intergenera-
tional risk sharing scheme makes it socially eﬃcient to raise the collective risk
exposure in order to take advantage of the large equity premium. When risks
are exogenous, the only beneﬁt of intergenerational risk- sharing is to make
pension beneﬁts safer, without changing the mean performance of savings. In
our model, risks are endogenous since the fund has the freedom to reallocate
its reserves between a risk free asset and a risky asset. The reform raises the
demand for equity. This additional collective risk exposure is only partially
oﬀset by the better diversiﬁcation. We then obtain the paradoxical property
that the better risk-sharing scheme raises the risk born by each generation!
Rather, the beneﬁt of the reform comes from the larger expected pension
beneﬁto ﬀered to all current and future generations. In order to elucidate
3this property, we consider a very simple two-period model in section 2.
Concerning the properties of the eﬃcient management of the fund, we can
summarize our main ﬁndings as follows. First, the share of the fund’s wealth
invested in the risky asset is an inverted U-shaped function of the fund’s cash-
in-hand. Compared to the well-known Merton-Samuelson optimality rule of
a wealth-independent investment share in the risky asset, two additional
eﬀects must be taken into account in our context. The ﬁrst one is due to the
solvency issue, which forces the fund to drastically reduce its portfolio risk
after a loss, when the solvency constraint becomes an issue. This explains
why the share of the fund’s ﬁnancial reserves invested in the risky asset is
increasing with respect to low wealth levels. The second one comes from the
existence of the ﬂow of future contributions which can be seen as a risk free
asset in the fund’s balance sheet. In order to maintain constant the share of
the risky asset in the fund’s total wealth as stated by the Merton-Samuelson
rule, the fund should invest relatively more in the risky asset at low levels
of cash-in-hand, and it should rebalance its portfolio in favor of the risk free
asset when the level of cash-in-hand increases.
Second, the beneﬁt distributed to new pensioners is increasing and con-
cave in the market value of the fund’s assets. When solvency is an issue,
the distributed beneﬁt above the contractual minimum is very sensitive to
the ﬁnancial situation of the fund, which means that intergenerational risk
sharing does not work well in these circumstances. On the contrary, when
the fund is wealthy, the beneﬁt distributed to the new pensioners is much
less sensitive to shocks on the market value of the fund’s assets. Two lessons
are derived from this observation. First, the intergenerational sharing of risk
is possible only when the fund has enough wealth to smooth ﬁnancial shocks
across diﬀerent generations of workers. The initial ratio of assets to liabili-
ties of the fund is a crucial aspect of this problem, which can be alleviated
by shareholders’ initial equity funding. Second, the eﬃcient share of risk
that should be born by retirees depends upon the ﬁnancial health of the
fund. This second conclusion diﬀers greatly from the conclusion obtained in
a standard PAYG system in which there is no solvency issue. Indeed, when
there is no such issue, the eﬃcient share of the aggregate risk that should be
born by retirees is independent of the history of past shocks.
We also measure the welfare gain of the improved risk sharing in the
economy. In order to perform this welfare analysis, we compare three long
term saving schemes. The ﬁrst saving scheme, which is presented in section
43, is based on personal retirement accounts. Workers determine their opti-
mal portfolio risk in each period of their life, knowing that there will be no
solidarity across generations in the case of a ﬁnancial downturn. We show
that it is optimal in this case for workers to invest a share of the balance
of their pension account that is decreasing with their age. Following this
dynamically optimal strategy yields a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
ﬁnal level of retirement wealth, opening the door to useful intergenerational
risk-sharing scheme.3 Assuming a risk free rate of 2% and a stocks’ excess
expected return of 3.9%, we show that following this optimal dynamic port-
folio strategy is equivalent in terms of expected utility of pension wealth to
a sure investment of lifetime savings at an interest rate of 3.33%.
The second long term savings scheme examined in section 4 yields a ﬁrst-
best intergenerational risk sharing. It maximizes a discounted sum of the
expected utility of future generations subject to an intertemporal budget
constraint. It minimizes the solvency issue by just constraining the market
value of the fund’s assets to be nonnegative. The ﬁrst-best solution is thus
quite unrealistic, but it is useful for measuring the maximum social surplus of
intergenerational risk-sharing. The ﬁrst-best strategy consists in investing a
constant share of the fund’s total wealth in the risky asset, and to distribute
a constant share of the fund’s total wealth to retirees. The fund’s total
wealth is the sum of the current ﬁnancial reserves and the net present value
of future workers’ contributions. The ﬁrst-best solution yields a level of
intergenerational welfare that is equivalent to the one that would be obtained
by investing pension savings at a risk-free interest rate of 4.39%. Compared
to autarky, this represents a 30% increase in the certainty equivalent of the
pension beneﬁts paid to all current and future generations.4 This shows the
potentially large welfare gain of intergenerational risk-sharing.
However, the main problem of the ﬁrst-best solution is the possible fast
exhaustion of the ﬁnancial reserves of the scheme and the potential resistance
3Poterba, Rauh, Venti and Wise (2003) evaluate the risk to retirement wealth of the
100/0, 50/50 and 0/100 age-independent allocation strategy in 401(k) plans, using a
stochastic simulation algorithm. They conclude that the 100% investment in equity over
the entire lifetime makes pension wealth very uncertain but optimal (if the investor has
some non-401(k) wealth) because of the large equity premium.
4When considering intergenerational risk sharing, the relevant concept of eﬃciency is
that of ex-ante Pareto-eﬃciency. See Demange and Laroque (1999) and Demange (2002)
for other concepts of eﬃciency with overlapping generations.
5of future generations to participate to the scheme as a consequence of such
circumstances. This is why in section 5, we examine in section 5 the more
realistic second-best pension scheme in which the pension fund is constrained
by a solvency ratio and by the requirement of a minimum rate of return
of 0% to its members. The second-best scheme yields an intergenerational
welfare that is equivalent to a 3.83% sure rate of returns on savings. This
still represents a 12.7% increase in the certainty equivalent pension beneﬁts
compared to autarky.5
2 The surplus of risk sharing when risks are
endogenous: A simple model
In order to evaluate the social surplus of intergenerational risk sharing, let
us consider a very stylized model with two agents. They have the same von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(z)=z1−γ/(1 − γ), where γ is the
index of relative risk aversion. The initial wealth of agent i, i = 1 or 2, is
denoted wi.A g e n ti can invest in two assets, one being risk free with a zero
return, and the other being risky with return e xi. We assume that e x1 and e x2
are independent and identically distributed with mean µ>0a n dv a r i a n c e
σ2. In autarky, each agent selects the dollar investment α that maximizes
the expected utility of ﬁnal wealth:
max
α Eu(wi + αe xi) ' u
µ










Suppose that the portfolio risk is small, so that the Arrow-Pratt approxima-




Plugging this solution into (1), we can evaluate the certainty equivalent payoﬀ
of the optimal portfolio as













5Given the diﬀerences in the modeling strategies, this estimation is reasonably compa-
rable to the one by van Hemert (2005), who estimated the welfare surplus to be 5.14% of
the consumers’ human capital.
6As a ﬁrst step in measuring the social surplus of risk sharing, let us
assume that the two agents decide to share risk e x1 eﬃciently, the individual
risk exposure αi being ﬁxed at their autarky level. Given our small risk
assumption, such risk transfer can be characterized by a linear function
t(x1)=t0 + ηα1x1 that determines the transfer from agent 1 to agent 2 as
a function of the realization of e x1. Again using Arrow-Pratt approximations,





































The optimal risk sharing rule η∗ is the one that maximizes CEQ(η). It is
easy to check that the optimal sharing η∗ equals w2/(w1 +w2), and that the






When the two agents have the same wealth, the certainty equivalent payoﬀ
associated with investment in e x1 is increased by 50%.
But there is an additional beneﬁt to extract from the eﬃcient risk sharing,
since the ability to pool risk e x1 across agents should induce them to accept
more of that risk. To explore this question, let us assume that the two agents



















It is easy to check that the optimal solution of this problem is still η∗ =




γσ2(w1 + w2). (3)
Observe that the demand for the transferable risk e x1 is increased com-
pared to autarky. The ability of the two agents to share a given risk increases
the demand for that risk. Sot, it is as if the agent’s wealth that was originally
protected form risk had been transferred to the initial risk-bearer. Equiva-
lently, it is as if agent 2 would have a direct access to the investment on risk
7e x1 through the eﬃcient risk-sharing scheme with agent 1. Notice also that
agent 1 increases the demand for his risky asset by a factor (w1 + w2)/w1,
but because he retains only a fraction w1/(w1 + w2) of the risk, he ends up
with exactly the same risk exposure. On the other side, agent 2 retains the
same exposure on e x2 and accepts some risk from agent 1, thereby bearing
more risk than in autarky. In fact, everything works as if agent 2 were to
subrogate the purchase of α2 units of risk e x1 to agent 1. Agent 1 purchases
this optimal amount of risk e x1 and transfers it to agent 2 through the agreed-
upon risk-sharing scheme. Globally, the better sharing of risk in the economy
induces everyone to end up with at least as much risk as in autarky. Still,







The social surplus of the e x1 risk-taking opportunity is increased by a factor
(w1 + w2)/w1. For two equally wealthy agents, this is a 100% increase in
surplus. The beneﬁt of the risk sharing is not to reduce risk, but rather to
increase the expected payoﬀ from the risky investment. Our main ﬁnding in
this section is that the ability to diversify risk induces people to accept more
risk so that only part of the additional risk is oﬀset by diversiﬁcation. In
short, when individual risks are endogenous, the access to risk sharing leads
people to increase their expected wealth, not to reduce their risk!
The easiest application of this model is to the international diversiﬁcation
of individual portfolios, where i =1a n di = 2 are two countries with inde-
pendent economic growth processes. In the context of this paper however,
i =1a n di = 2 are two disconnected periods, where the growth process of
the economy exhibits no serial correlation. The risk-sharing in that context
takes a form of whereby the earlier generation contributes to the economy’s
aggregate capital accumulation by consuming less than its net production, in
order for the future generation to consume more than what it will produce.
Of course, this transfer can be contingent only upon the information avail-
able during the lifetime of the ﬁrst generation. Thus, the ﬁrst generation
cannot bear some share of the second generation’s risk, which implies that
only risk e x1 can be shared. When we consider a speciﬁc (pension) fund to
serve as a medium for these intergenerational transfers, the sharing of risk
across generations is limited by the solvency of the fund. This is the central
issue analyzed in this paper.
83 Optimal individual saving accounts
The economy is composed of overlapping generations of a ﬁxed size that is
normalized to unity. Each generation contributes to a pension fund during
n = 40 years. The yearly contribution y is paid out by the active workers
at the beginning of the year. We are in a context of deﬁned contributions,
which implies that y is exogenous to the model. At the end of the nth
year, the old generation receives a beneﬁt whose level is endogenous to the
model. This retiring generation is replaced by a young generation which starts
contributing to the fund. This means that n contributing generations coexist
in the fund, which receives ny monetary units at the end of each period. The
welfare of a generation is measured by the expected utility that it obtains
from consuming the pension beneﬁt at the retirement age. The workers’
utility function u is increasing and concave in the pension beneﬁt b.
There are two ﬁnancial assets in the economy, one of which is risk-free.
Asset returns are unpredictable. The gross yearly return of the risk free
asset is constant over time and is equal R. In our calibration, we consider an
interest rate of 2% (R =1 .02). The excess return of the risky asset in year
t is denoted e xt. There is no serial correlation of returns over time, so that
e x1,e x2,..are independent and identically distributed. R and e x are exogenous.
In particular, we assume that they are not aﬀected by the architecture of
the pension system, as would be thec a s ei nas m a l lo p e ne c o n o m y . W e
calibrate our model with the empirical distribution of the real yearly return
of the SP500 in excess of the risk-free rate over the period 1963-1994. The
expected real excess return is Ee x = µ =3 .9%, and the standard deviation is
σx =1 3 .6%.
As a benchmark, we examine an economy in which there is no risk shar-
ing. The fund can be interpreted in that case as a collection of n individual
saving accounts. In this model, each generation can be considered in autarky.
At the beginning of each of the n contribution years, the generation has to
determine how much of its reserves to invest in the risky asset with the rest
being invested in the risk-free asset. Let αt denote the monetary investment
i nt h er i s k ya s s e ta tt h eb e g i n n i n go ft h etth contribution year, t =1 ,...,n.
The ﬁnancial reserve of a generation from contribution year t − 1t oc o n t r i -
bution year t is denoted wt. The individual dynamic portfolio problem can
9be written as
U
aut =m a x
α1,...,αn
Eu(e b)( 5 )
s.t. w1 =0 ;
wt+1 = R(wt + y)+αte xt,t =1 ,...,n;
e b = wn+1.
In this paper, we assume that workers have constant relative risk aversion
equaling γ, so that u(b)=b1−γ/(1 − γ). We take a relatively conservative
position by assuming that γ =5 .6 In that case, the solution to this dynamic
portfolio problem is well-known since Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969).
It is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The optimal dynamic portfolio strategy of an individual sav-
ing account is such that
αt = a
aut(wt + ht), with a
aut = a
∗R (6)
for t =1 ,...,n,where wt is the value of the portfolio at the beginning of period
t, ht = Σ
n−t
i=0R−iy is the residual net present value of future contributions, and
a∗ is the unique positive solution of the equation Ee x(1 + a∗e x)−γ =0 . When
measured from the beginning of the ﬁrst period, the optimal expected utility













Proof: See Appendix 1. ¥
The optimal investment in the risky asset at any time t is a constant
proportion a∗R of the household’s total retirement wealth, which is deﬁned
as the sum of the value wt of the portfolio and of the residual Net Present
Value (NPV) of the future contributions. This reﬂects the well-known fact
that myopia is optimal under constant relative risk aversion: the time horizon
has no eﬀect on the share of the investor’s total wealth to be invested in the
6This implies that workers are ready to pay as much as 2.4% of their wealth to eliminate
a ﬁfty-ﬁfty risk to gain or loose 10% of their wealth.
10risky asset. For the numerical value of our benchmark case, we estimate that
a∗ =3 9 .6%, so that the optimal share of the total retirement wealth to be
permanently invested in the risky asset is 2% larger, i.e., aaut =4 0 .4%.
Notice that the share of the current balance of the individual account











It is usually decreasing with age, since the balance wt of the pension account
will be typically increasing with age, whereas the NPV, ht, of future contribu-
t i o n si sd e c r e a s i n gw i t ha g e .T h u s ,w h e r e a si ti so p t i m a lt oi n v e s tac o n s t a n t
share of total pension wealth in equity, it is usually optimal to reduce the share
of current ﬁnancial wealth invested in equity when approaching retirement
age. This argument has been proposed by Bodie, Merton and Samuelson
(1992) to justify the standard recommendation to reduce portfolio risk when
growing older.7
When following this optimal investment strategy, the retirement wealth
is distributed as






Using this equation, one can check that the expected retirement wealth is
thus equal to Rn(1 + a∗µ)nh1 =1 1 3 .7y, whereas the standard deviation of
retirement wealth equals Rn [(E(1 + a∗e x)2)n − (1 + a∗µ)2n]h1 =3 9 y.
Proposition 1 also gives us the expected utility Uaut of the retirement
capital in autarky, as measured when the household starts to save. We
deﬁne the certainty equivalent ﬁnal wealth Baut a st h es u r ep e n s i o nw e a l t h
that yields the same expected utility for the retiree as the random pension
wealth e b that is obtained by following the optimal portfolio strategy (6):












In our benchmark case, we obtain Baut =8 4 .1y. The constant ﬂow of saving
optimally invested in ﬁnancial markets over the n = 40 years preceding
7Other arguments for and against a decreasing age-proﬁle of the optimal assets alloca-
tion are discussed in Gollier (2005).
11retirement yields the same expected utility for the retiree as receiving an
amount of capital 84 times the yearly saving rates at retirement age. This
means that the psychological cost of risk — or the risk premium — equals
29.6y.W e c a n a l s o d e ﬁne the certainty equivalent rate of return on saving











Under our numerical speciﬁcation, we obtain a certainty equivalent rate of
return raut =3 .33%. The ability to invest in stocks raises the certainty equiv-
alent rate of return on savings from the risk-free rate of R−1=2 %t o3 .33%.
This return is still far away from the expected rate of equity, which is assumed
in our calibration to be equal to 5.9%.
To end this section, observe that the optimal investment strategy is diﬃ-
cult to implement when credit markets are ineﬃcient. Indeed, at the begin-
ning of his ﬁrst year of contribution, the worker should invest aauth1 =1 1 .27y
in the risky asset, whereas he has only y on his pension account at that time.
This means that implementing the optimal strategy would require the worker
to borrow more than 10 times his current pension balance to invest in equity.
Because this is unrealistic, we consider a constrained version of program ( 5)
w h e r ew ea d dt h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a tt h ei n v e s t m e n ti nt h er i s k ya s s e tc a nn e v e r
exceed the current balance of the pension account: αt ≤ wt+y, t =1 ,...,n.
A simple (myopic) rule-of-thumb is that the worker invest the unconstrained
optimum αt = a∗R(wt + ht) as long as the no-borrowing constraint is not
binding, and to be 100% in equity when it is binding:8
αt =m i n ( a
aut(wt + ht),w t + y). (9)
The no-borrowing constraint is likely to be binding early in the consumers’
contribution period of consumers, and to be slack once the worker has ac-
cumulated enough ﬁnancial reserves in his pension account. We estimated
8We are aware of the fact that this myopic strategy is not the optimal one under the no-
borrowing constraint, as shown by Grossman and Vila (1992). Even if the constraint is not
binding today, the risk that it could bind in the future has an eﬀect on the optimal current
portfolio allocation. However, given the fast decreasing NPV ht of future contributions, the
probability of this event occurring is small. Indeed, we solved numerically the constrained
version of the program and found no diﬀerence between the optimal solution and the
rule-of-thumb strategy.
12numerically the certainty equivalent pension wealth and the certainty equiva-
lent return of this individual pension saving. We got respectively Baut =8 1 .9y
and raut =3 .23%. These values are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the un-
constrained case.
It appears that the uncertainty on the ﬁnal wealth available to the retiree
is large, in spite of the important rebalancement of portfolios in favor of the
risk-free asset as investors get closer to retirement. In order to measure the
riskiness of the pension wealth at retirement age in autarky, we performed
a simulation of 100,000 random scenarios of n years of yearly performances
of the equity market. Our ﬁndings are summarized in Figure 1, where we
draw the frequency table of ﬁnal pension wealth. The smallest and the
largest pension wealth levels in these scenarios have been 28.12y and 446.7y,
respectively, with an average value of 103.7y and a standard deviation of
32.1y. The upper limit on the share of wealth that can be invested in the
risky asset decreases with both the mean and the standard deviation of the
retirement wealth.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE
This shows that there is ample room for intergenerational risk sharing
in this economy. It is noteworthy that, as explained by Samuelson (1963),
there is no time-diversiﬁcation of the portfolio risk going on in this personal
retirement system. The portfolio r i s kt a k e ni ny e a r1i sn o td i v e r s i ﬁed away by
the portfolio risk taken over the n−1 remaining years. Diversiﬁcation could
exist here only through an intergenerational scheme, in which one generation
exchanges half of its lifetime portfolio risk with half of the portfolio risk borne
by another (distant) generation.
4 First-best intergenerational risk sharing
In this section, we consider the viewpoint of a hypothetical social planner
who is strong enough to commit all future generations to contribute to a
collective Deﬁned Contribution pension system. We thus abstract from any
consideration about the potentially opportunistic behavior of future genera-
tions. In short, we will characterize a ﬁrst-best solution. Our aim here is to
estimate the maximum welfare gain that can be attained through intergen-
erational risk sharing. Of course, this ﬁrst-best solution is unrealistic. This
is why we will consider a second-best solution in the next section.
13Suppose that at time t =0 ,t h en current generations agree to transfer
their individual saving accounts to a pension fund that would be allowed
to reallocate risks across generations. Let Y0 denote the value of this initial
transfer. It depends upon the realized returns of the risky asset during the last
n years. We hereafter assume that Y0 equals the average wealth accumulated





where Ewt is the expected wealth accumulated by the generation in contribu-
tion year t in autarky. Using the model of the previous section, we obtained
numerically that Y0 equals 1638y. In this section, we assume that contri-
butions to the fund by future generations are compulsory. The net present









In our calibration, we obtain that K equals 2040y.
Let wt be the market value of all assets owned by the fund at the end of
year t−1. At the beginning of year t, the fund collects the savings y of the n
contributing generations. It also distributes the beneﬁt bt to the generation
which just retired at the end of the previous period. As before, αt is the
money investment in the risky asset by the fund in year t.I nF i g u r e2 ,w e
represented these ﬂows in year t.
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE
We measure the social welfare of the overlapping generations of workers
by the discounted sum of the ﬂow of expected utility generated by consuming
their pension wealth at retirement. Consider the decision problem of the fund
at the beginning of period 0. We look for the dynamic contingent strategy of
the fund, both in terms of the distribution b and the portfolio management
α that maximize the welfare of the overlapping generations of workers:
U










wt+1 = R(wt − bt + ny)+αte xt, ∀t ≥ 0;
wt + K ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1,
with w0 = Y0, and where β is the discount factor used by the social planner
to weight the welfare of the diﬀerent generations. Observe that we allow the
fund to value the ﬂow of future contributions, so that the market value of all
”assets” of the fund equals wt + K, which is constrained to be nonnegative.
It happens that the solution of this program is well-known.
Proposition 2 The ﬁrst-best beneﬁts distribution and assets allocation are
such that
b
fb(w)=m(w + K) with m =1−
¡
βR







fb(w + K), with a
fb = R(1 − m)a
∗, (14)
where a∗ solves Ee x(1+a∗e x)−γ =0 . Moreover, the expected growth rate of the
fund’s ﬁnancial wealth constant and equal to
E [wt+1 + K | wt]
wt + K
= R(1 − m)(1 + a
∗µ). (15)







Proof: See Appendix 2. ¥
The optimal strategy of the fund is characterized by two policy functions
b and α such that bt = b(wt)a n dαt = α(wt). These two functions can
be interpreted as an explicit contract among the diﬀerent generations that
stipulates how much risk will be accepted, and how these risks will be al-
located over time. We see that these functions are linear with the market
value wt of fund’s assets. In fact, both the pension beneﬁt and the risky in-
vestment can be expressed as constant shares of the fund’s aggregate wealth,
15which includes both the value wt of the ﬁnancial assets and the NPV K of
the promised future contributions to the fund. As proposed for example by
Vald´ es-Prieto (2005), the idea is to explicitly include this additional asset in
the balance sheet of the fund by securitizing the ﬂow of future contributions
on ﬁnancial markets.
The only parameter that remains to be selected is the discount factor
β, which governs the relative generosity of the system between current and
future generations. Observe that the choice of β inﬂuences the share m of
the aggregate wealth of the fund to be distributed to the current retirees. A
larger β implies a smaller m, and a larger growth rate of the fund’s expected
wealth to be distributed to future generations. We propose to choose β in
order that the growth rate of the fund’s wealth be exactly zero in expectation,









In our calibration exercise, this means that β =0 .9374. This implies that the
aggregate wealth of the fund follows a martingale, and the ﬁnancial shocks
on its reserves are permanent.9 This also implies that all present and future
generations have the same expected retirement beneﬁt conditional on the
information available at the time of the reform.
Every year, the fund should distribute to the retiring generation a con-
stant share m =3 .43% of the aggregate fund’s wealth. This means for
example that a generation bears only 3.43% of the portfolio risk taken by
the fund the year before this generation retires, thereby illustrating the in-
tergenerational risk sharing of the scheme. The optimal portfolio strategy is
to invest a constant share afb = R(1 − m)a∗ =3 9 .0% of the fund’s aggre-
gate wealth in the risky asset.10 Because the aggregate wealth includes the
net present value K of the ﬂow of future contributions, this implies that the
demand for risky assets is much increased by the improved intergenerational
9For any β larger than 0.9374, the social planner will take advantage of the large assets
returns by accumulating more reserves over time. The wealth of the pension fund would
therefore be non-stationary.
10The diﬀerence between aaut =4 0 .4% and afb = 39% just comes from the fact that, in
the ﬁrst-best solution, the fund must pay an immediate beneﬁt to the retiring generation.
If we base our computations on the fund’s after-beneﬁt-payment wealth, we would have
that the share of aggregate wealth to be invested in equity would be exactly the same in
the two cases: a∗R =4 0 .4%.
16risk sharing arrangement. This is perfectly in line with the conclusion of
Section 2, where we showed that the eﬃcient sharing of risk has the same
eﬀect on the demand for equity as the transfer of wealth of the future gener-
ations to the current ones. Under the system of individual pension accounts
presented in the previous section, we have estimated numerically the av-
erage demand for the risky asset,and we obtained E [
Pn
t=1 αaut
t ] ' 932.7y.
T h ed a yt h er e f o r mi si m p l e m e n t e d ,t he demand for the risky asset jumps
to αfb(Y0 + K) = 1434.4y. This represents a 54% increase in the demand
for the risky asset. Because risks are better diversiﬁed in the economy, it is
socially eﬃcient to accept more risk in the economy.
Conditionally on the information available at the date of the reform, the
retirement beneﬁt paid to the generation retiring at date t is distributed as







As mentioned earlier, because of our choice of β, the mean of e bt, which equals
m(Y0 + K)=1 2 6 .2y, is time-independent. On the contrary, its standard
deviation m(Y0+K)Rt(1−m)t [(E(1 + a∗e x)2)t − (1 + a∗µ)2t] is growing with
the time horizon. For example, the young generation entering the labour
market just at the time of the pension reform and retiring in 40 years faces
a standard deviation equaling 43.6y, a n dt h i sn u m b e rg o e su pt o5 4 .1y for
the generation that will retire 20 years after, in 60 years. In Figure 3, we
have drawn the empirical distributions of the pension beneﬁts paid to these
two generations. These results shouldb ec o m p a r e dt ot h ec a s eo fa u t a r k y ,i n
which the mean pension wealth is 105.8y, and its standard deviation is 39y.
These results are in line with the properties of the simple risk sharing model
that we developed in Section 2. Namely, the beneﬁt of the intergenerational
risk sharing does not translate into less risk borne by each generation. Rather,
the intergenerational sharing of risk induces an increase in the demand for
the risky asset, thereby increasing the expected return of their portfolio and
the overall performance of the pension fund.
INSERT FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE
Finally, using (16), we can measure the impact of the ﬁrst-best intergen-
erational risk sharing scheme on intergenerational welfare. As in the previous
section, it is easier to measure the certainty equivalent constant beneﬁt Bfb
distributed to all future generation that yields the same intergenerational
17welfare: Ufb = u(Bfb)/(1 − β). In our calibration, we obtain Bfb =1 0 8 .8y,
ab e n e ﬁt that should be compared to what generations obtain in autarky,
Baut =8 4 .1 y.T h eﬁrst-best solution yields a social surplus which is equiv-
alent to a 29% increase in the beneﬁts paid to all future generations of pen-
sioners. In terms of the certainty equivalent interest rate on savings, using
a formula equivalent to (8), we obtain that rfb =4 .39%. This is a consider-
able increase compared to the certainty equivalent interest rate obtained in
autarky: raut =3 .23%.
*******************
Add information about mean and volatility of bfb, and discuss the link
with the mickey mouse model: no reduction in risk for the ﬁrst generation,
but increased performance.
*******************
However, this social surplus is not shared equally among the future gener-
ations. Indeed, seen from the day of the reform, all future generations enjoy
t h es a m ee x p e c t e dp e n s i o nb e n e ﬁt, but the generations living in the distant
future face a larger uncertainty about their pension beneﬁt than the current
generations. It implies that the reform is in fact relatively more favorable to
the current generations, given their risk aversion. To see this, we can deﬁne
the certainty equivalent b
fb
t of the generation retiring at date t, conditional on
the information available at date t =0 , as u(b
fb
t )=Eu(e bt). Using equation














0 = m(Y0+K). We obtain q =0 .9926 with the value of our parameters.
This means that, seen from t =0 , the certainty equivalent pension beneﬁt
decreases at a rate of 0.75% per year. This implies that the reform makes
generations living in the very distant future ex-ante worse oﬀ,a n dt h er e f o r m
is therefore not ex-ante Pareto-improving.11
As is usual in most dynamic risk sharing arrangements, there is a possible
commitment problem. Because of the large portfolio risk taken by the fund,
successive adverse shocks on ﬁnancial markets can dramatically reduce the
funds’ reserves in such a way that young workers may prefer to switch back
11The ex-ante Pareto-superiority of the reform would require selecting a larger discount
factor β. But that would imply that the fund’s reserves would increase without bound in
expectation.
18to an individual pension system. To examine this question, we determine
the certainty equivalent pension beneﬁt bfb(w) for a young worker who starts


















1−γ¤n (w + K)1−γ
1 − γ
.(20)
A commitment problem arises for the young generation entering into the
system if bfb(w) is smaller than the certainty equivalent pension in autarky
Baut =8 4 .1y. We derived numerically that this happens when reserves w are
smaller than 1250y. In spite of the fact that the initial reserves Y0 =1 6 3 8 y
much larger than this minimum, such a situation is quite likely to occur
at the same point in the future. For example, based on a simulation over
100000 random scenarios, we estimated that the probability that the level of
reserves w40 be smaller than 1250y forty years after the reform is 42%.
5 Second-best intergenerational risk sharing
The ﬁrst-best intergenerational risk sharing scheme is hardly politically sus-
tainable if a succession of negative shocks on ﬁnancial markets arises early
in the life of the fund. In particular, the fund may need to oﬀer a negative
return on contributions in order to restore its future attractiveness in the
future. In this section, we add a few additional constraints to the system in
order to make it less sensitive to this political sustainability problem.
5.1 The second-best constraints
The key additional element that we add in the system is a constraint on
the minimum return that must be given to workers. The fund guarantees a
minimum gross return Rmin to workers on their savings. This guaranteed min-
imum return of the fund can be interpreted as a portfolio insurance scheme.







19Because of this guarantee, the fund is also constrained to maintain at all
times and in all states a minimum capital wmin which is the guaranteed
capital accumulated by the current contributing generations. The solvency
check is made at the beginning of the year, after pensions and dividends have
been paid, but before contributions have been received. This means that if,
for any reason, the fund has to interrupt its activities, the current market
value of its assets would be enough to repay the contributions paid in the
past by the currently active workers, in addition to a return Rmin on these





















The last equality holds only if Rmin is not equal to unity. When Rmin =1 ,
we simply have that wmin = yn(n +1 ) /2. In our benchmark calibration,
we assume that the fund must guarantee a minimum return of 0% on the
workers’ contributions, i.e., Rmin = 1. Combining this with n =4 0 , we obtain
that the minimum capital requirement is wmin =8 2 0 y. The minimum beneﬁt
paid to retirees is bmin =4 0 y.
We consider an economy in which a shareholder company manages the
pension fund. Shareholders live forever and have an increasing and concave
utility function v on the dividends dt that are paid to them by the fund at
the beginning of each year. To make things comparable with the ﬁrst-best
solution, we assume that shareholders have the same attitude towards risk as
workers: v ≡ u. Because the shareholders’ marginal utility tends to inﬁnity
when the dividend tends to zero, it is never eﬃcient that shareholders bring
more equity to the fund.
At date t =0 , the new pension scheme is created and is funded with the
combination of equity e0 from shareholders and of initial contributions Y0
from the n generations of workers living at that time, so that w0 = e0 + Y0.
As in the previous section, we assume that Y0 equals 1638y.T h e r e i s a
competition among insurers to determine who will manage the fund in the
future. This implies that v0 equals the expected utility that insurers can
obtain by investing e0 directly on ﬁnancial markets, or that







20s.t. et+1 = R(et − dt)+αte xt, ∀t ≥ 0;
et ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1.







.( 2 3 )
Given this shareholders’ utility reservation level v0,c o n s i d e rn o wt h ed e -
cision problem of the fund at the beginning of period 0, given its ﬁnancial
reserves w0 = e0+Y0 ≥ wmin. We look for the dynamic contingent strategy of
the fund, both in terms of distribution and portfolio management, that max-
imizes the welfare of the overlapping generations of workers, subject to the
participation constraint (25) of the shareholders of the fund, the minimum
beneﬁt constraint, the solvency constraint and the no-borrowing constraint:
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≥ v0;( 2 5 )
w0 = Y0 + e0 (26)
wt+1 = R(wt − bt − dt + ny)+αte xt, ∀t ≥ 0; (27)
bt ≥ bmin, ∀t ≥ 0; (28)
wt ≥ wmin, ∀t ≥ 0; (29)
αt ≤ wt − bt − dt + ny, ∀t ≥ 0. (30)
This maximization program is well-behaved and has a feasible solution if
R is larger than Rmin. T h eo p t i m a ls o l u t i o ni sr e f e r r e dt oa st h es e c o n d -
best strategy. Because this program has no analytical solution, we hereafter
rely on a numerical algorithm to describe the second-best strategy. Using
Mathematica c °, we solve the problem by backward induction using 200 iter-
ations, starting from the ﬁr s t - b e s tv a l u ef u n c t i o n .I nT a b l e1 ,w es u m m a r i z e
the value of the exogenous parameters of the model.
21γ =5 : constant relative risk aversion of workers and shareholders;
β =0 .9374 : discount factor;
e x : excess return of the risky asset (Ee x =3 .9%; σx =1 3 .6%);
R =1 .02 : gross interest rate;
Rmin =1 .00 : gross guaranteed minimum return on contributions;
wmin =8 2 0 y : minimum value of assets of the fund;
Y0 = 1638y : initial contribution of workers at t =0 ;
e0 : initial equity of the insurance company at t =0 .
Table 1: Parameter values in the calibration
5.2 The allocation of risk between workers and share-
holders
For any positive scalar λ, deﬁne the function b u(.;λ)a sf o l l o w s :
b u(c;λ)=m a x
b
u(b)+λv(c − b)s . t . b ≥ bmin. (31)
It is easily shown that b u(c;λ) is increasing and concave in c, and that the
solution b(c;λ) of this program is increasing in c. Moreover, it is immediate
that we can rewrite program (24) as
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sb









s.t. w0 = Y0 + e0
wt+1 = R(wt − ct + ny)+αte xt, ∀t ≥ 0;
wt ≥ wmin, ∀t ≥ 0;
αt ≤ wt − ct + ny, ∀t ≥ 0,
where λ is selected in order to satisfy the shareholders’ participation con-






tv(e ct − b(e ct;λ))
#
= v0. (33)
22Taking the initial equity e0 and the induced shareholders’ reservation level
v0 computed from (23), the natural methodology would be to ﬁnd the λ that
solves (33). Because the solution of program (32) is itself a function λ,t h i s
would be a diﬃcult problem to solve numerically. We reverse-engineered this
strategy by solving program (32) with an arbitrary (but cleverly chosen) λ,
and by computing the corresponding shareholders’ reservation level v0 using
equation (33) and the initial equity level e0 using equation (23).
By decomposing program (24) into programs (31) and (32), we disen-
tangle the dynamic accumulation and risk-taking problem (32) of the fund
from the purely static problem (31). Program (31) is a standard cake-sharing
problem which determines how the total yearly payment c o ft h ef u n di na n y
given year should be shared between a beneﬁt b to workers and a dividend
d = c−b to shareholders. Because u and v exhibit the same constant relative
risk aversion, the ﬁrst-best risk sharing rule would be to allocate a ﬁxed pro-
portion k ∈ [0,1] of the payment to workers: e bt = ke ct,w i t hk =( 1+λ1/γ)−1.
As explained above, we hereafter ﬁx k = 90% (yielding λ =1 .69 × 10−5),
and we derive the corresponding equilibrium equity e0 brought by sharehold-
ers when the fund is created. We obtain e0 =3 5 6 y. T h i si sar e l a t i v e l y
marginal amount compared to the initial funding by the existing generation,
which was assumed to be Y0 =1 6 3 8 y, and to the NPV K =2 0 4 0 y of future
contributions.
The presence of the guaranteed minimum return of workers’ contributions
implies that the second-best risk-sharing rule between workers and sharehold-
ers takes the following form:
e bt =m a x ( bmin,ke ct). (34)
The second-best contract oﬀers a constant share k of the total yearly payment
of the fund to the retiring workers, as long as this pension beneﬁt is larger
than the guaranteed minimum bmin. The dividend paid to shareholders equals
e dt =m i n ( e ct−bmin,(1−k)e ct). It is noteworthy that the indirect utility function
b u exhibits a constant relative risk aversion γ = 5 as long as the minimum
return constraint is not binding. When this constraint is binding, workers
do not participate to the sharing of the portfolio risk, thereby raising the
relative risk aversion of the syndicate. This relative risk aversion goes up to
plus inﬁnity when the total payment c goes down to bmin.
The shareholders of the fund thus provide portfolio insurance to the
workers. They get a premium for this service. Indeed, their contribution
23e0 =3 5 6 y represents only 8.82% of the total initial value of the fund, which
is e0 + Y0 + K = 4034y. But they have a right on 10% of the distributed
earnings, as long as the fund is ﬁnancially healthy.
5.3 The beneﬁt policy and the dividend policy
In this section, we examine the second-best strategy of beneﬁt payment to the
retiring generation. This beneﬁt is a function of the level of ﬁnancial reserves
of the fund at the retirement date: bt = bsb(wt). We have seen that the ﬁrst-
best beneﬁtp o l i c yf u n c t i o nw a sbfb(w)=0 .0343w +6 9 .97. In Figure 4, we
depicted the second-best beneﬁt distributed to retiring workers as a function
of w. When the market value of the assets of the company is approaching
the minimum reserve level 820y, it is optimal to limit the beneﬁtp a i dt o
the retiring workers to its minimum guaranteed level bmin =4 0 y.O t h e r w i s e ,
the beneﬁt is increasing and concave in w. For very large values of w,t h e
second-best beneﬁtc o n v e r g e st oi t sﬁrst-best level. The second-best beneﬁt
is always smaller than its ﬁrst-best level: bsb(w) ≤ bfb(w)f o ra l lw.T h e
diﬀerence is particularly important when the fund’s ﬁnancial health is much
deteriorated.
INSERT FIGURE 4 AROUND HERE
This illustrates the fact that the ﬁnancial reserves of the fund are used as
ab u ﬀer stock ` a la Deaton (1991) to organize the intergenerational sharing
of risk. The level of the buﬀer stock must be well-enough enough above wmin
to make it feasible and eﬃcient under the solvency constraint of the fund.
This provides an additional incentive for the fund to reduce the distribution
of beneﬁts when w is close to wmin. This reduction of the beneﬁtp a i db yt h e
fund in bad times is an eﬀort made in the short run that is helpful to restore
the eﬃciency of the fund in the long run.
The uncertainty about the pension beneﬁts that the fund will pay in
the future depends upon the time horizon under consideration. In Figure 5,
we depicted the distribution of the beneﬁts paid to the generation retiring
respectively 40 and 60 years after the reform. These distributions were ob-
tained by performing 10000 random simulations of 60 years of equity returns,
starting with a fund’s initial reserve equaling Y0 + e0. The mean pension
beneﬁts are 106.2y and 107.5y for the population retiring in 40 and 60 years,
respectively. The standard deviations are respectively 35.8y and 44.5y.
INSERT FIGURE 5 AROUND HERE
24The second-best strategy to distribute dividends to the shareholders of
the insurance company is depicted in Figure 6. When the minimum return
constraint is not binding, the second-best dividend equals (1−k)/k =1 1 .11%
of the beneﬁt paid to retiring workers, as explained in the previous section.
When this constraint becomes binding, shareholders must drastically reduce
their dividend. Because shareholders provide portfolio insurance to workers,
they are highly exposed to the downside risk on the performance of the
fund. In theory, it could be useful to ask shareholders to provide additional
equity when the fund’s ﬁnancial health becomes critical. This is allowed in
our model since we do not restrict the dividend to be positive. However, a
negative dividend would not be renegotiation-proof. We escaped this problem
by assuming that the utility function of the shareholders is CRRA, which
implies that a negative dividend can never be optimal. This implies that
shareholders contribute to the ﬁnancing of the system only up-front, so that
they always have the incentive to control the system. In addition, their
exposure to the downside risk of the fund provides an additional incentive
for the shareholders to eﬃciently manage the fund’s assets.
INSERT FIGURE 6 AROUND HERE
5.4 The investment policy
The second-best investment in the risky asset in year t is a function of the
market value of the assets of the fund at that time: αt = αsb(wt). This opti-
mal strategy is described in Figure 7. It should be compared to the ﬁrst-best
investment αfb(w)=a∗(w + K), which is characterized by a constant share
of the risky asset in the total wealth of the fund, including the market value
K of future contributions. Of course, this ﬁrst-best strategy is not feasi-
ble in the second-best context, since the fund would take too much risk in
a ﬁnancially stressed situation. Following the ﬁrst-best investment strategy
would yield an important insolvency risk. The reduction of the risk expo-
sure in these situations guarantees the solvency of the fund at the cost of
as i g n i ﬁcant reduction in the expected performances of the fund’s portfolio.
The solvency constraint reduces the ability of the fund to time-diversify the
portfolio risk, thereby making it more risk-averse at low wealth levels. It is
as if the fund exhibited decreasing absolute risk aversion, as explained by
Epstein (1983) and Gollier (2002).
INSERT FIGURE 7 AROUND HERE
25In Figure 8, we have drawn the investment in the risky asset as a fraction
of the ﬁnancial reserves of the fund, not taking into account the NPV of
future contributions. The ﬁrst-best share αfb(w)/w = a∗(w + K)/w is a
decreasing hyperbola. Indeed, the fund should take into account of the ﬂow
of future contributions, which can be interpreted as a risk free asset in the
fund’s balance sheet. Therefore, at low levels of the ﬁnancial reserves w,t h e
fund should invest a relatively large fraction of its cash-in-hand, w,i nt h e
risky asset in order to compensate for the existence of this risk free asset in
the fund’s total wealth. This eﬀect is diluted at larger levels of the fund’s
ﬁnancial reserves. The second-best investment strategy αsb(w)/w described
in Figure 8 combines the solvency eﬀect already exhibited in Figure 7 and
the eﬀect of the safe ﬂow of future contributions. It has an inverse U shape
with a maximum at 56% when the fund’s reserves are around 2.5t i m e si t s
minimum level. It tends to afb =3 9 .0% when the fund’s reserves tends to
inﬁnity.
INSERT FIGURE 8 AROUND HERE
5.5 The dynamics of reserves accumulation
In the ﬁrst-best solution, we have seen that the fund’s level of ﬁnancial re-
serves is a martingale in the sense that the growth of the fund’s expected
wealth is zero. The discount factor β has been selected to obtain this property
of the ﬁrst-best solution. Two contradictory eﬀects inﬂuence this rate in the
second-best context. First, because the distribution of beneﬁts to retirees is
less generous (bsb(w) <b fb(w)), the second-best fund accumulates reserves
faster. This positive eﬀect is particularly strong at low wealth levels. Second,
the second-best investment strategy is more precautionary than the ﬁrst-best
one. This reduces the expected portfolio return of the fund. This negative
eﬀect on the rate of accumulation is also particularly strong at low wealth
levels. In Figure 9, we have drawn the expected rate of increase of the fund’s
ﬁnancial reserves as a function of w. We see that the second-best expected
growth rate is always positive, but it tends to zero for high levels of reserves.
When the ﬁnancial health of the fund is much deteriorated, this rate can be
as large as half of one percent per year. This illustrates the fund’s willing-
ness to escape the solvency problem that would inhibit intergenerational risk
sharing.
INSERT FIGURE 9 AROUND HERE
26In Figure 10, we have drawn the 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles of 60.000
simulated paths of the fund’s reserve over the ﬁrst 100 years of the fund.
We already know that the expected level of the fund’s reserve is constant
over time. This ﬁgure tells us that the distribution of the fund’s reserve is
positively skewed. This is the consequence of the optimal investment and
distribution strategies, in which the fund becomes extremely prudent when
the fund’s reserve tends toward its lower solvency limit.
INSERT FIGURE 10 AROUND HERE
L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h ee ﬀect of a negative excess return of x = −10% of
the risky asset on the ﬂows generated by the fund. Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h i s
negative shock occurs in year t =0 , when w = Y0 + e0 =1 9 9 4 y.F r o mt h i s ,
the fund paid b0 =1 0 6 .5y to new retirees and d0 =1 1 .9y to shareholders.
Because it collected 40y in contributions from workers, the fund’s reserves
amounted to 1915.6y,f r o mw h i c hαsb =1 0 8 3 y has been invested in the
risky asset. With a return of −10% on this investment, the return of the
fund’s portfolio at the end of year t =0i st h u se q u a lt o0 .02(1915.6y) −
0.1(1083y)=−70y.T h e ﬁnancial reserves at the beginning of the second
year equal w1 = 1845.6y, a7 .44% reduction from the previous year. It yields
a reduction of the pension beneﬁt to the generation retiring at the beginning
of year t =1t ob1 =1 0 0 .8y, a5 .35% reduction compared to the pension
paid to the previous generation. The demand for the risky asset is reduced
by 8.4%. In Table 2, we computed these values when the adverse shock
occurs in other circumstances. The net eﬀect of the ﬁnancial shock on the
fund reserves is increasing in the market value of its assets. This illustrates
the fact that the fund takes proportionally more portfolio risk at high wealth
levels.
w =1 0 0 0 y w =1 9 9 4 y w =3 0 0 0 y
∆w/w −3.88% −7.44% −7.38%
∆b/b −4.90% −5.35% −5.36%
∆α/α −19.71% −8.40% −6.73%
Table 2: The short-term eﬀect of a negative excess return x = −10% on
reserves (∆w/w), pension beneﬁts (∆b/b) and the demand for stocks
(∆α/α). These short-term eﬀects are evaluated for three diﬀerent initial
levels w of the fund’s reserves.
275.6 Welfare analysis
The discounted value of the ﬂow of generational expected utilities at date
t =0e q u a l sUsb. As before, we measure the certainty equivalent constant
beneﬁt Bsb distributed to all future generations that yields the same inter-
generational welfare: Usb = u(Bsb)/(1 − β). We obtain Bsb =9 4 .8y.T h i s
is better than the certainty equivalent pension Baut =8 4 .1y obtained in au-
tarky, but much worse than the certainty equivalent pension Bfb =1 0 8 .8y
obtained in the ﬁrst-best context. The second-best pension system improves
welfare, but the constraints imposed on it imply that only 43% of the po-
tential social surplus of intergenerational risk sharing. In terms of certainty
equivalent return on savings, we obtain rsb =3 .83%, w h i c hi si nb e t w e e n
raut =3 .23% and rfb =4 .39%.
An alternative approach consists in estimating the welfare of any speciﬁc
generation conditional on the fund’s reserves when this generation starts
contributing to the pension fund. Parallel to what we have done in the ﬁrst-





u(e bt+n)|wt = w
i
. (35)
The right-hand side of this equality can be numerically estimated by using
backward induction. The outcome of these computations is depicted in Fig-
u r e1 1 .W es e et h a tbsb(w)i ss m a l l e rt h a nbfb(w)f o ra l lw.T h i sm e a n st h a t
the second-best fund is less attractive than the ﬁrst-best fund for new workers
at all reserves levels, because of the ineﬃcient intergenerational risk sharing.
We also see that new workers prefer to save on their own when the fund’s
reserves at the time of their ﬁrst contribution is less than wsus = 1905y.12
This is called the ”minimum sustainable reserve”. Notice that the initial re-
serve Y0 + e0 = 1994y exceeds the minimum sustainable reserve, so that the
fund is attractive for the founding generations. However, there is no guaran-
tee that the fund’s assets value will permanently remain above wsus.I ft h e
participation in the fund is on a voluntary basis, when wt is less than wsus,
the new generation entering in year t would not accept to contribute to the
fund unless a tax incentive for long-term savings is oﬀered. For example, in
the most critical situation with wt =1 0 0 0 y, the certainty equivalent beneﬁt
distributed by the second-best fund is equal to bsb(1000y)=5 9 .1y, which is
12Notice that wsus is deﬁned by u(bsb(wsus)) = Uaut.
2829% smaller than the certainty equivalent beneﬁt obtained in autarky. A tax
incentive of this order would be necessary to make the second-best pension
scheme sustainable.
INSERT FIGURE 11 AROUND HERE
6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we perform some sensitivity analyses of the second-best pen-
sion scheme. The parameters of the model are β (the discount factor),
Rmin (the guaranteed minimum gross return), R (the risk-free rate), e x (the
distribution of the stock returns), γ (relative risk aversion), and e0 (the ini-
tial equity). As explained in section 5.2, there is a one-to-one relationship
between e0 and v0 (equation (23), and between v0 and the share k of the
yearly payment of the fund that is allocated to the retiring generation, with
the remaining 1 − k being paid to shareholders. Numerically speaking, it is
much easier to ﬁx k as an exogenous choice variable, and to derive on the
e0 that is compatible with this k at equilibrium. We have seen earlier that
our benchmark initial equity e0 =1 0 0 y is compatible with the distribution of
k = 90% of the yearly fund’s payment to workers. In our sensitivity analy-
sis, we ﬁx k = 90% and we select the initial equity e0 that is compatible
with this k.T a b l e 3 s u m m a r i z e o u r ﬁndings. The diﬀerent lines of this
table are self-explanatory, except the line referred to as E(wt+1 − wt)/wt.
As seen in Figure 9, the expected yearly change in the fund’s assets value
depends upon the state variable w. On this line, we report its asymptotic







Rmin=1 0 0 %
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rsb 3.83% 4.09% 4.07% 3.91% 3.37%
initial reserve
Y0+e0
1994y 1968y 2015y 2455y 1723y
initial risky investment
α0
1083y 970y 1290y 1332y 798y
initial pension beneﬁt
b0
106.5y 120.6y 114.6y 109.7y 85.3y
initial dividend
d0
11.9y 13.4y 12.7y 27.4y 9.5y
FB growth rate of reserve
E(wt+1−wt)/wt
0% −0.8% 0% 0% 0%
min sustainable reserve
wsus 1905y 2198y 1728y 2281y 1619y
Table 3: Eﬀect of a reduction of the discount factor β, of a reduction of the
guaranteed gross return Rmin,o far e d u c t i o no ft h es h a r ek of the fund’s
total yearly payment accruing to retirees, and of a leftward translation of
the distribution of excess returns e x.
• Reduction of β from 0.9374 to 0.9: The current generations are favored
by this reduction of the discount factor. The beneﬁt paid to the retir-
ing workers during the ﬁrst year of the fund is increased, together with
the dividend paid to shareholders. Because risks are less eﬃciently al-
located across generations, the fund reduces its exposure to portfolio
risk. All these changes converge towards the fact that the expected
yearly change in the fund’s assets value be reduced with respect to the
benchmark. In fact, the expected change becomes negative. Finan-
cial reserves converge in expectation to wmin. Because of its generous
beneﬁts paid early to retiring workers, the fund is beneﬁcial for inter-
generational risk sharing only in the short and medium terms. In the
long term, the ﬁnancial reserves of the fund cannot be used as a buﬀer
stock to smooth shocks across generations, because of the solvency con-
straint.
30• Reduction of Rmin from 100% to 90%: Reducing the guaranteed min-
imum return on savings is good for the intergenerational sharing of
risks. This change has a sizeable impact on the certainty equivalent
return of the pension scheme. Because shareholders are less exposed
to the downside ﬁnancial risk, the equilibrium initial equity e0 is in-
creased. The optimal portfolio risk exposure is also increased, because
this risk is shared more eﬃciently with future generations. This yields
an increase in the beneﬁts paid to new retirees and to shareholders.
• Reduction of k from 90% to 80%: Increasing the share of the fund’s
portfolio return accruing to shareholders raises the equilibrium equity
initially invested in the fund by shareholders. Because the initial value
of the fund’s assets is much above the legal minimum to satisfy the
solvency constraint, the fund is in a better situation to organize an
eﬃcient intergenerational risk sharing. The certainty equivalent return
on savings is thereby improved compared to the benchmark. The share
of the fund’s assets invested in stocks, the beneﬁt paid to new retirees
and the dividend paid to shareholders are all increased.
• Deterministic reduction of stocks returns by 1%: This change in ex-
pectations dramatically reduces both the investment in the risky asset
and the certainty equivalent return on savings. Because of the reduced
return on savings, the willingness to accumulate wealth over time is
reduced. In fact, a decumulation process arises under these values of
the parameters, as in the case of the reduction of β. Notice that this
translation of the distribution of excess returns also aﬀects the work-
ers’ welfare in autarky, yielding a reduction of the certainty equivalent
p e n s i o nw e a l t ht oBaut =7 3 .2y, and of the certainty equivalent interest
rate to raut =2 .75%.
7 Concluding Remarks
The aims of this paper were twofold. First, we wanted to characterize oper-
ational rules for a pension fund to optimize both the sharing of risk across
generations and the dynamic portfolio management of this fund. We showed
that both the asset allocation of the fund and the promised pension beneﬁts
should be contingent upon the fund’s assets to liabilities ratio. The target
31share of the fund’s assets to be invested in equity should be around 40 and
50%, but this share should be drastically reduced when the ﬁnancial health
of the fund deteriorates. The target share of the fund’s reserves to be distrib-
uted as pension beneﬁts should be around 3.5%, but this share of pension
beneﬁt distributed to retirees should go down to the minimum guaranteed
level when the solvency constraint becomes an issue.
Second, we wanted to estimate the welfare gain of intergenerational risk
sharing. Compared to a purely individual retirement system, we showed that
organizing a ﬁrst-best intergenerational risk-sharing scheme has an eﬀect on
the welfare of all current and future generations that is equivalent to an
increase by more than 1 percentage point in the return on their retirement
savings. However, this welfare gain is halved when solvency constraints are
imposed to the pension fund to reinforce the long-term political sustainability
of the scheme.
Many proponents of the preservation of the PAYG system argue that
this system, contrary to a funded system, is able to implement an eﬃcient
intergenerational sharing of risk. Contrary to this view, we have shown in
this paper that a cleverly built, transparently funded system can do much to
bolster the risk-sharing eﬃciency of a limited public intervention program.
Our work is also useful to reﬁne an argument long used by proponents of
radical changes in social security sch e m e s . A c c o r d i n gt ot h e i rv i e w ,t h e
PAYG system should be abolished due to its low rate of return. The problem
is to determine to which rate of return of the funded system should it be
compared. If it is compared to the real risk-free rate, which has been around
1.5% in the U.S. and around -1% in France during the twentieth century,13
the argument is not very strong. If it is compared to the average real return
on equity, which has been around respectively 7% and 4% in the U.S. and
in France, the argument would be much stronger. Some proponents of the
funded system claim that this alternative comparison is the relevant one,
because of the ability of the pension fund to time-diversify equity risk. Using
a calibration based on U.S. ﬁnancial data, we have shown that this argument
is only partially true, and that the implementation of the realistic second-best
pension scheme has a certainty equivalent rate of return around 4.4%.
This paper attempts to provide a realistic estimation of the welfare gains
13For a synthesis of ﬁnancial returns during the last century, see Dimson, Marsh and
Staunton (2000).
32of intergenerational risk sharing. However, to make the model tractable, we
made several simpliﬁcations compared to real pension schemes. Therefore,
the paper could obviously be improved in many directions. First, we assumed
that the risk-free rate is constant over time and that future stocks returns are
unpredictable. We recognize that these two assumptions are important, but
quite unrealistic. Long term ﬁnancial intermediaries are very sensitive to the
interest rate risk and this should be treated formally in a future extension
of this work. Introducing predictable changes in the two assets returns will
make the second-best beneﬁt policy function dependent on the additional
state variables of the system, in particular on the current interest rate. The
pension beneﬁt policy function and the optimal management of the fund’s
assets will be sensitive to changes in these additional state variables. Second,
we considered for simplicity a deﬁned contribution scheme. It would be useful
to see how a more ﬂexible contribution rule would be useful for a better
sharing of risk over time. We should also take into account the diversity
of tastes and preferences (that are aﬀected by the number of dependants)
among the consumers, as well as the possibility of premature death. Third,
one could consider more sophisticated portfolio insurance rules, such as the
one consisting in ”locking in” successive beneﬁts to active members of the
fund. This would be a third-best approach.
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35Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
By backward induction, we can rewrite program (5) as
vt(w)=m a x
α Evt+1(R(w + y)+αe x),
for t =1 ,...,n,t o g e t h e rw i t hvn+1(w)=w1−γ/(1−γ)a n dUaut = v1(0). The
solution αt of this program is a function αt(w) of the single state variable w.
Let us consider the trial solution function vt+1(w)=Kt+1(w+ht+1)1−γ/(1−
γ), for some positive scalar Kt+1 and where ht = Σ
n−t
i=0R−iy. Notice that it
implies that
vt+1(R(w + y)+αe x)=Kt+1




(R(w + ht)+αe x)
1−γ
1 − γ
The ﬁrst-order condition for the above program can thus be written as
Kt+1E
£
e x(R(w + ht)+αt(w)e x)
−γ¤
=0 .
It is immediate that this is true only when αt(w)=a∗R(wt + ht)w h e r ea∗
solves Ee x(1 + a∗e x)−γ =0 . It implies in turn that
vt(w)=Kt+1E
"








where δ = R1−γE(1+ a∗e x)1−γ. Thus, our trial solution is correct, with Kt =
δKt+1. This implies that
U











This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
36A p p e n d i x2 :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
The proof of this proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. By
backward induction, we can rewrite program (12) as
v(w)=m a x
b,α
u(b)+βEv(R(w − b + ny)+αe x).
Let us consider the trial solution function v(w)=q(w + K)1−γ/(1 − γ), for
some positive scalar q. Notice that it implies that
v(R(w−b+ny)+αe x)=q




(R(w − b + K)+αe x)
1−γ
1 − γ










e x(R(w − b + K)+αe x)
−γ¤
=0 .
It is easy to check that b(w)=b m(w + K)a n dα(w)=a∗R(1 − b m)(w + K)
solves this system, with b m =( kq1/γ +1) −1 and k =( βR1−γE(1+a∗e x)−γ)1/γ.
Replacing the functions appearing in the following equality
v(w)=u(b(w)) + βEv(R(w − b(w)+K)+α(w)e x)
by their expressions assumed above, we obtain that
q = b m
1−γ + βqR































37Finally, we have that
E [wt+1 + K]=R(wt − bt + ny)+αtEe x + K
= R(wt + K) − Rm(wt + K)+R(1 − m)a
∗µ(wt + K)
= R(1 − m)[1+a
∗µ](wt + K).
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. ¥
Appendix 3: Numerical method to characterize the second-best
solution
In order to characterize the second-best solution, we proceed numerically
by backward induction. We ﬁrst ﬁxt h es h a r ek of the total annual payment
accruing to retirees. This yields the associated λ = ((1 − k)/k)γ and the
indirect utility function b u deﬁned by equation (31). This eliminates the
risk sharing aspect of the problem between shareholders and workers. The
remaining problem to solve is program (32). It can be rewritten as
V (w)=m a x
c,α b u(c)+βEV(R(w − c + ny)+αe x)
subject to w ≥ wmin and α ≤ w − c + ny. We consider its dynamic version:
Vt(w)=m a x
c,α b u(c)+βEVt+1(R(w − c + ny)+αe x)( 3 6 )
subject to the same constraints. We start with the initial value function





Using this speciﬁcation, we numerically solve program (36) for t = T −1. We
discretize w in interval [wmin,20wmin ]b ys t e p∆w = wmin/1000. For each
of the corresponding w, we solve program (36), and we obtain VT−1(w). We
use this value function to solve this program for t = T − 2. We iterate this
process 150 times. It converges if β is small enough.
During this procedure, we compute the discounted expected utility of
both pension beneﬁts and dividends, as functions of the fund’s reserve. At
the end of this converging process, we compute the initial equity e0 which
equalizes v0 to the discounted expected utility of the ﬂow of dividends, given























































































































































































Figure 1: Frequency (in %) of ﬁnal pension beneﬁts b = wn+1 in autarky.
 
αt : investment in the risky asset 
xt: return of the risky asset  wt 
bt : pension 
ny : contributions 
wt+1 





















































































































































































Figure 3: Frequency (in %) of ﬁnal pension beneﬁts e b
fb
t under the ﬁrst-best
pension mechanism. The white and black bars are for people retiring t =4 0
and t = 60 years after the reform, respectively.











Figure 4: The ﬁrst-best pension beneﬁt (dashed) and the second-best pension
beneﬁt (plain) as a function of the fund’s reserve w. The shaded rectangle






















































































































































































Figure 5: Frequency (in %) of ﬁnal pension beneﬁts bsb
t under the second-best
pension mechanism. The white and black bars are for people retiring t =4 0
and t = 60 years after the reform, respectively.











Figure 6: The second best dividend paid to the fund’s shareholders as a
function of the fund’s reserve w.







Figure 7: The second-best investment in the risky asset expressed as a frac-
tion of the total wealth of the fund w + K. The dashed line describes the
ﬁrst-best investment strategy.








Figure 8: The second-best share of the fund’s reserve w invested in the risky
asset, as a function of w. The dashed curve describes the ﬁrst-best strategy.











Figure 9: The expected yearly rate of increase of reserves as a function of
the fund’s reserve, in the second-best context.











Figure 10: The 5%, 50% and 95% percentiles of 60.000 simulated paths of
the fund’s reserve w over the ﬁrst 100 years of the fund, in the second-best
context.












Figure 11: The certainty equivalent beneﬁt b conditional to the fund’s reserve
w at the beginning of the worker’s contribution period, for the ﬁrst-best,
second-best and autarky contexts.
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